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Summary 
The River Ouse forms a significant part of Humber river system, which drains about 
one fifth the land area of England and provides the largest fresh water source to the 
North Sea from UK. The river quality in the tidal river suffered from sag of dissolved 
oxygen (DO) during last few decades, deteriorated by the effluent discharges. The 
Environment Agency (EA) proposed to increase the water quality of Ouse by 
implementing more potent environmental policies. This paper explores the cost 
effectiveness of water management in the Tidal Ouse through various options by taking 
into account the variation of assimilative capacity of river water, both in static and 
dynamic scope of time. Reduction in both effluent discharges and water abstraction 
were considered along side with choice of effluent discharge location. Different 
instruments of environmental policy, the emission tax-subsidy (ETS) scheme and 
tradable pollution permits (TPP) systems were compared with the direct quantitative 
control approach. This paper at the last illustrated an empirical example to reach a 
particular water quality target in the tidal Ouse at the least cost, through a solution of 
constrained optimisation problem. The results suggested significant improvement in the 
water quality with less cost than current that will fail the target in low flow year. 
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The River Ouse forms a significant part of Humber river system, which drains about 
one fifth land area of the England and provides the largest fresh water source to the 
North Sea from UK. The river quality in the tidal river suffered from sag of dissolved 
oxygen  (DO)  during  last  few  decades,  deteriorated  by  the  effluent  discharges.  The 
Environment  Agency  (EA)  proposed  to  increase  the  water  quality  of  Ouse  by 
implementing  more  potent  environmental  policies.  This  paper  explores  the  cost 
effectiveness of water management in the Tidal Ouse through various options by taking 
into account the variation of assimilative capacity of river water, both in static and 
dynamic scope of time. Reduction in both effluent discharges and water abstraction were 
considered along side with choice of effluent discharge location. Different instruments of 
environmental  policy,  the  emission  tax-subsidy  (ETS)  scheme  and  tradable  pollution 
permits (TPP) systems were compared with the direct quantitative control approach. 
This  paper  at  the  last  illustrated  an  empirical  example  to reach  a  particular water 
quality  target  in  the  tidal  Ouse  at  the  least  cost,  through  a  solution  of  constrained 
optimisation problem. The results suggested significant improvement in the water quality 
with less cost than current that will fail the target in low flow year.  
Key  words:  water  quality  management,  tradable  pollution  permits,  tax  and  subsidy, 
effluent discharge, water abstraction, dynamic equilibrium, integrated river policy, cost 
effectiveness 
JEL: C31, C61, L51, R19 
1. Introduction 
1.1 Problem in the tidal Ouse 
The river Ouse forms part of the Humber river system, which drains about one fifth 
of the land area of England. The Humber estuary, which is the largest fresh water source 
to the North Sea from UK, together with its tributaries and other eastern rivers contain a 
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richer fish fauna than any other rivers in England. A big proportion of the Humber 
catchment is densely populated and industrialised, most of which is drained by Yorkshire 
Ouse  and  Trent  systems.  The  confluences  of  the  main  tributaries  of  Ouse  are 
downstream  of  its  tidal  limit,  with  only  a  quarter  of  the  flow  from  the  non-tidal 
catchment (Edwards et al. 1997). The Humber river system is shown in Figure 1 as 
below. This paper focuses on the water quality in the tidal Ouse along with its tributaries 
Wharfe, Derwent, Aire and Don.  
Salmon  were  common  in  the  Ouse  up  to  the  nineteenth  century.  However, 
development of industries along the various tributaries in the late eighteenth and early 
nineteenth centuries led to an enormous increase in effluent discharged to the river. This 
together with some other factors led to the reduction of salmon in the Ouse. As a result, 
the EA chose salmon as a key indicator of the river’s ecological health, and proposed to 
improve water quality by implementing more effective environmental policies (Cashman 
et al. 1999). This Paper aims to evaluate the cost effectiveness of water management and 
pollution control in the tidal Ouse through different options, taking into account both 
effluent discharges and water abstraction.     
1.2 Water quality management in the Tidal Ouse  
Although the river quality has been improved significantly in Ouse system in the last 
ten years, it still suffers from the DO sag in the summer months, especially downstream 
of Selby industrial effluent discharges. As a result DO levels in some parts of the river 
and at some times of the year are too low to support fish. The worst DO sag locates 
around Selby and Long Drax during the summer months, preventing the returned salmon. 
The decline of salmon stock in the Ouse system is due to a number of factors, which 
includes over-fishing around Greenland, commercial netting in estuaries, habitat loss, 
increased sediment load and river morphology changes. But effluent discharges from the 
industries  were  regarded  as  the  primary  cause  of  DO  sag.  Rainfall  also  varies 
dramatically over space and time in the catchment region, with highest rainfall over 
1600 mm p.a. in parts of Pennines and in the winter due to the prevailing wind (Law et 
al. 1997), and much less rainfall in Southeast catchment and dry summer. The inland 
penetration of tides during low flows transports sediment upstream, while resuspension 
of sediments results in considerable DO consumption. In addition, large quantities of 
river water are abstracted and transferred through its grid by Yorkshire Water to supply 
portable water for over 3.5 million people, and returned to the river system through 
sewage treatment works. One obvious effect on the water quality in the tidal Ouse is the Cost effectiveness in River Management: Evaluation of Integrated River Policy System in Tidal Ouse      
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reduction  of  clean freshwater  flows from  northern rivers and rising  volume  of  poor 
quality water returned from the industrial south tributaries (Edwards et al. 1997) 
 
The EA intends to improve river water quality by tightening discharge consents in 
Selby. A new system of pollution control is being implemented in order to restore water 
quality  in  the  Ouse,  which  is  driven  by  the  EU  Directive  on  Integrated  Pollution 
Prevention and Control (IPPC). The essence of IPPC is that operators should choose the 
best option available to achieve an agreed level of protection of the environment taken 
as a whole. The Best Available Techniques (BAT) approach is typically modified by the 
declaration that the cost of applying techniques should not be excessive in relation to the 
environmental protection it provides. However, the IPPC Scheme requires BAT to be 
applied in the abatement of pollution while no clear definition of BAT is provided. A Cost effectiveness in River Management: Evaluation of Integrated River Policy System in Tidal Ouse      
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more rigorous way of addressing the issue of cost is to identify the most cost effective 
method for achieving a given targeted reduction on emissions.  
Water abstraction has impacts on river water quality as well as effluent discharges. 
Since river volume affects the assimilative capacity, it is apparent that water abstraction 
has adverse impacts on river water quality, and the effects are interdependent of the 
effects of effluent discharged into the river body. Therefore, it is necessary to include 
both industrial effluent and water abstraction in an integrated regulation system. To date, 
however, effluent discharge consents and water abstraction licenses have not taken into 
account variation in the assimilative capacity of river, or the interdependence of effluent 
and water abstraction.  
The current regulatory system controlling effluent discharge and water abstraction in 
Tidal  Ouse  and  Humber  estuaries  is  characterized  by  two  different  policies  both 
implemented by the EA: discharge consents for effluents and a system of tradable Water 
Abstraction Licenses for water abstractions respectively. The consents for effluents take 
fixed value over the year, though some allow certain extent of variation and violation 
over the year.  An abstraction licence generally states how much water may be taken, 
from where it may be taken, how it may be used and where it may be returned to river. 
Water abstraction licenses recently became time limited and can only be renewed upon 
application. However, the amount granted each license is given on the annual basis and 
allows the abstractor to take water from river any time of the year, no matter what the 
river condition is. 
Because of these inefficiencies in the current regulations system, excessive social 
costs are carried by both the industries involved and the local economy that they serve. 
Most firms that discharge effluents into the tidal Ouse are located in the Selby area. The 
extra costs imposed by regulations may have significant impacts on the local economy 
and residents. This paper explored the potential cost advantages of rive policy based on 
the  variation  of  assimilative  capacity  or  river  water.  Using  a  water  quality  model 
developed for the EA to set the effluent consents, this research evaluated the potential 
options in water quality management that are available for the tidal Ouse following the 
variation of assimilative capacity. This paper also derived a simplified system of water 
quality functions through regression for the tidal Ouse, based on the most influencing 
factors to the DO saturation (DO%) of river water.  This system of water quality function 
was  then  combined  with  the  cost  functions  derived  for  various  water  quality 
management options to construct the static optimisation analysis, which revealed a cost 
minimisation solution for a given water quality compliance required by the EA. The cost 
minimisation solution was able to significantly improve the water quality and remove Cost effectiveness in River Management: Evaluation of Integrated River Policy System in Tidal Ouse      
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the DO sag even for one of the years with the least river flow and the worst ambient 
water quality, while still having a cost saving of £200,000 per year to the current annual 
costs of water management in the tidal Ouse.  This integrated river policy considered in 
this  optimisation  does  not  just  imply  integration  on  effluent  discharges  and  water 
abstractions, but also the physical effect on water quality and the social cost of water 
management,  which  is  consistent  to  the  requirement  of  the  most  recent  European 
regulation of Water Framework Directive (WFD).   
1.4 The structure of the paper 
The  paper  consists  of  six  sections.  The  second  section  discussed  two  previous 
researches  for  the  pollution  control  in  the  estuarine  systems  in  UK  that  initiate  the 
evaluation  of  cost  for  water  quality  improvement.  These  were  compared  with  this 
research as well.  
A third section offers a static analysis of environment policy to control pollution 
along the river when the spatial location of effluent sources and water abstraction were 
referred in the river regulation. This paper discussed the necessary condition to achieve 
the  least  cost  for  a  particular  water  quality  target  under  a  static  system  and  the 
underlined economic interpretation.  
The fourth section offered dynamic analysis for the same issue, when the relevant 
activities to control water quality were driven by the investment and capital stock within 
the  sector.  The  cost  minimisation  under  the  dynamic  system  led  to  an  unstable 
equilibrium  of  saddle  point,  in  which  the  steady  state  can  only  be  reached  through 
specific investment path. I also discussed differences between the equilibria of the ETS 
scheme  and  the  TPP  system,  which  are  usually  the  same  under  static  analysis. 
Comparative statics indicate the direction of change in the dynamic system caused by 
the  policy  instruments,  when  alteration  is  necessary  to  achieve  the  prescribed 
environmental target.  
 Section five illustrated an empirical example of water quality improvement in the 
tidal  Ouse, through  an integrated  measure consistent  to  the  variation of assimilative 
capacity of river water, to achieve the given water quality target at the least costs. The 
section discussed the methods and solution of the constrained optimisation problem, 
showing that the water quality could be dramatically improved following the solution 
generated with more than £200,000 cost saving over the current cost of water quality 
management which cannot prevent the DO sag in low flow conditions. 
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Although most economists agree that Market Based Instruments (MBIs) are more 
efficient both in cost saving and dynamic incentives over Command and Control (CAC) 
approaches (Oates and Strassmann 1984; Baumol and Oates 1988; Perman et al. 1996; 
Hanley et al. 1997; Cowan 1998), uncertainty over both pollution-related environmental 
damage and costs and benefits estimates, the significance of hazardous environmental 
risks,  and  significance  of  fixed  costs  could  reduce  their  advantages  over  the  direct 
regulatory standards (Turner et al. 1994; Zylicz 2003).  Since estuarine system involves 
considerable uncertainty, it is a moot point to say MBIs are necessarily more appropriate. 
Two  papers  have  discussed  the  implications  of  market-based  instruments  for  UK 
estuaries.  
(a) The Tees Estuary Study (Rowley 1979) 
In 1979, the Tees Estuary was so “grossly polluted” that it was not able to support 
fisheries  from  Stockton  to  the  mouth  of  the  estuary.  Research  by  Rowley  et  al. 
investigated  the  possibility  of  utilizing  an  emission  charge  rather  than  regulatory 
consents to control pollution in the estuary and to achieve satisfactory water quality. 
Nine major industrial pollution sources were included in an economic model in which a 
least-cost solution was found, using transfer coefficients from a water quality model. 
Appropriate charge rates were identified for particular water quality targets. The study 
found that the cost of reaching the desired water quality objective would be much lower 
using emission charge instruments than regulatory consents. It also found that control 
costs were sensitive to the time period within which the target was required to be met. 
Hence emission charge rates were different in different stretches. However, information 
asymmetry between the regulator and industrial sources, and the stepwise nature of the 
marginal cost function complicated implementation. The monitoring and enforcement of 
the emission charge was also projected to be expensive to administer. Overall, the study 
questioned the feasibility of the emission charge instrument. 
(b) The Forth Estuary in Scotland (Hanley and Moffatt 1993; Hanley et al. 1998) 
The  Forth  Estuary  located  in  central  Scotland is  a multi-use  resource,  providing 
water supply for industrial use, recreation, habitat and effluent disposal from industrial 
and sewage works. The most significant problem was seasonal DO sag as in the Ouse, 
associated with low flow and high temperature conditions. As a result some stretches of 
the  river  fail  to  comply  with  Environmental  Quality  Standards  (EQS).  The  most 
significant economic effect was thought to be the effects on the salmon fisheries because 
the low DO% prevents the return migration of salmon. The direct cause of the DO sag is Cost effectiveness in River Management: Evaluation of Integrated River Policy System in Tidal Ouse      
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the effluent emission from the sewage works and industrial processes, among which 
industrial sources accounted for 87% of total BOD loading.   
An economic model was developed to minimize the control costs subject to the 
environmental constraints, alongside a model of water quality. The author explored the 
possibility of using a potential tradable permits system to improve the water quality at a 
lower cost than uniform restriction on each pollution source. Control costs in each plant 
were evaluated for several BOD load reduction scenarios. The corresponding marginal 
cost (MC) of control was found to be sensitive to the timescale allowed for the reduction. 
The  potential  cost  saving  was  calculated,  and  compared  with  the  costs  of  uniform 
constraints.  
In the 1993 paper, Hanley and Moffatt conducted a simulation within which the least 
cost solution was compared to Tradable Emission Permit (TEP), emission charges and 
flexible regulations. A novel result showed that the flexible regulation was closest to the 
least  cost  solution  although  it  could  not  provide  a  continuing  incentive  to  reduce 
emissions in the most efficient manner. In the 1998 paper, Hanley conducted the analysis 
under both an Emission Permits System (EPS) and an Ambient Permits System (APS). 
In EPS, emission permits are traded on a one-to-one base along the whole length of the 
Estuary. The cost of achieving the target under EPS was increasing at the margin, and 
large cost savings were proved over the uniform emissions control. In APS the permits 
are traded on the basis of their transfer coefficients and the target is an improvement in 
the mean DO% in the estuary rather than a cut in BOD loading. The author found a large 
influence from resuspended bottom sediment on the DO distribution along of the estuary, 
both from current and past anthropogenic activities.  
In  both  studies,  the  effect  of  policy  instruments  on  the  pollution  control  were 
subjected to static analysis, and only focused on the effluent emissions to the river. This 
paper integrated water abstraction and effluent discharges, as these are interdependent to 
their impact on water quality. In addition, the research discussed above did not consider 
the dynamic problem, but assumed that plants maintained outputs, and the same level of 
emissions. Both static and dynamic analysis were provided the in this research on the 
river policy and its cost effectiveness, though the empirical example of tidal Ouse was 
evaluated against the static analysis alone due to the constraint of data.  
3. Static Analysis of Environmental Policy 
The  water  policies  currently  implemented  in  England  and  Wales  dealing  with 
effluent discharge consents and water abstractions are effluent discharge consents and 
tradable water abstraction licenses. Currently, neither instrument takes account the river Cost effectiveness in River Management: Evaluation of Integrated River Policy System in Tidal Ouse      
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flow. Since river flow has an impact on assimilative capacity and consequently on river 
water quality, it is necessary to consider the effect of time-varying and location-specific 
consents and licenses to cope with variations in river conditions.  
3.1 A General model of cost efficiency of pollution abatement  
I assumed a particular pollution externality produced by several firms in a market. 
The firms are competitive with each other, and produce a homogenous output i q , and 
during  production  generate  emissions  i e  to  the  whole  market.  With  an  exogenously 
determined output price and some inputs invested in pollution abatement, the firm’s 
profit may be defined as follows:  
) ( ) , ( ) , ( i i i i i i i e q C pq q B Τ − − = α α                                              …(3.1) 
) , ( i i i i q s e α =                                                                       …(3.2) 
i q  is product output from site i, facing an exogenous price  p ; i α  denotes the level of 
abatement activity and  ) ( i e Τ  reflects private emission-related costs at site i, which can 
be attributed to the existence of environmental policy (Xepapadeas 1997).  
Although regulation of effluent discharges regulated the pollution discharged into 
the receiving water body, only ambient water quality matters. For the tidal Ouse estuary, 
there are five Water Quality Monitoring (WQM) sites downstream from Naburn Weir to 
Blacktoft before its confluence with Tidal Trent at Trent Fall. Water quality in the tidal 
Ouse is influenced by several factors including the tributaries water qualities, industrial 
emissions, and water abstractions by water companies as well as volume, velocity and 
micro plankton activity of the river. 
 Water quality at site s is assumed to take the form  s s s s s s s H E A f Q γ ε + = ) , , , (  
and the ambient water quality target at site s  is  s Q . It follows that the water quality at 
WQP s must satisfy s Q Q s s ∀ ≥ , , where 
s A  is background water quality including the inputs from other tributaries at WQP site s, 
s E  is aggregate industrial effluent discharge at WQP site s,  
s H  is aggregate water abstraction at WQP site s, 
s ε  is  a  vector  of  other  environmental  factors  that  will  influence  the  water  quality, 
including velocity, volume, river flow and tide etc, and  Cost effectiveness in River Management: Evaluation of Integrated River Policy System in Tidal Ouse      
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s γ  is variations not captured by this function. 
When locations of effluent discharge and water abstraction matter, a simple sum of 
emissions  and  abstraction  from  all  the  sources  are  not  appropriate.  Instead,  transfer 
coefficients of impacts on the water quality at various water quality sites from different 
sources are applied to evaluate the aggregate impacts. It is assumed that the sources 
linearly contribute to the aggregate emissions or abstractions on the water quality at 
WQP site s. Thus 
∑ ∑
= =






is k ks s s s e b e e b e b e b E
1 1
2 2 1 1 L L ,                               …(3.3) 
∑ ∑
= =






is k ks s s s d d d d H
1 1
2 2 1 1 β β β β β L L ,                         …(3.4) 
where  is b  and  is d are the transfer coefficients of impact from the pollution discharge or 
water abstraction at site i  on the water quality at site  s .  i e  and  i β  are the effluent 
discharge and water abstraction at site i respectively.  
3.2 Static Cost effectiveness in ambient water quality control 
Let the cost function of each plant at site i, either industrial plant or water company, 
take the form of  ) , , ( i i i i a q C β  where  i q  and  i a  are the industrial output and abatement 
level at site i respectively, and i β  is the amount of water abstraction at site i. Assume 
that for any combination of  i q  and  i a , the industrial effluent discharge to the river from 
site i,  i e , can be determined. At this point in time, no firm both discharges effluent to 
river and abstracts water at the same time in Selby. Many sources of emissions to the 
Ouse currently use ground water for their production process. Nevertheless, I allow for 
the case where a firm at site i  has  0 > i e  and  0 > i β  at the same time. For a pure 
effluent  discharger, 0 = i β  and  vice  versa.  Therefore  the  cost  effective  allocation  of 
effluent abatement and water abstraction is the solution to the following problem: 
Minimize ∑
i
i i i i a q C ) , , ( β   
Subject to: , ) , , , ( s s s s s s s s Q H E A f Q ≥ + = γ ε for all the  r s K 2 , 1 = . 
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0 ) , , , ( ≤ − − s s s s s s s H E A f Q γ ε ;                                                              …(3.11) 
( ) s H E A f Q s s s s s s s s ∀ = ⋅ − − , 0 ) , , , ( λ γ ε ;                                                 …(3.12) 
s i a q s i i i ∀ ∀ ≥ , , 0 , , , λ β   
s i i i a q λ β , , , are all assumed to be positive unless there is plant shut down or any WQP 
is of no interest of protection. Therefore it follows: 
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Taking  the  effects  on  the  catchment  as  a  whole,  cost  effectiveness  implies  that 

































































                             …(3.17) 
Equation  (3.17)  has  clear  economic  meaning.  The  cost  effective  allocation  of 
effluent abatement and water abstraction in the catchment requires the output, abatement 
and  abstraction  from  site i  have  the  same  ratio  between  marginal  private  cost  and 
marginal impact on the river water quality at all the WQP sites. To be cost efficient, this 
would equal to the marginal social value of ambient water quality improvement at each 
site. To be cost effective, the environmental target is met at least cost to society. By 
switching the target from cost efficiency to cost effectiveness, the exact value of shadow 
price is no longer a constraint for the allocation of emissions and abstraction. Actually, 
for whatever the ratio is, cost effectiveness will be achieved as long as the prescribed 
































































where a reflects the preference of choice of the environmental authority. 
 4. Dynamic Analysis of Environmental Policy 
4.1 Dynamic problem with continuous time 
In the dynamic system, output, abatement and abstraction are dynamic functions of 
the capital stock available to the firm (assuming that the costs of labour are negligible 
compared with capital costs, and could be included in the operational costs). The initial 
capital stock of firm depends on prior investment, which is exogenous in the model, and 
depreciation of the capital stock. The output, abatement and abstraction are assumed as 
below to be functions of their capital stocks, which are dynamic against time.  
  )) ( ( ) ( t k q t q
q
i i i =  
)) ( ( ) ( t k a t a
a
i i i =  
)) ( ( ) ( t k t i i i
β β β =  Cost effectiveness in River Management: Evaluation of Integrated River Policy System in Tidal Ouse      
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The problem then is to identify the optimal future investment path under different 
environmental policy instruments, and to evaluate their feasibility. The time horizon of 
the dynamic problem is taken to be infinity. This is not necessarily because that the firm 
or environment authority has a prospect of sustainable development for infinite time, but 
even if the time horizon of planning were finite, the remaining value still have to be 
estimated at the horizon by discounting what they are in the future (Aronsson et al. 
2004).  Therefore,  the  optimisation  problem  may  be  written 
as, ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) (
0 0 0
















⋅ = ⋅ + ⋅ = + ⋅ ρ ρ ρ ρ . That is, the 
optimisation problem in a finite horizon will end up the same as the problem in an 
infinite horizon.  In this paper, the firm’s objective is to minimize the aggregate costs of 
achieving the desired water quality level.  The environment authority is to maintain 
water quality at least at the required level during whatever the policy horizon.  
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The corresponding Lagrange Equation is 
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and the transversality condition is 
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From (4.6) 
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then substitute Eq. (4.13) into Eq. (4.8), 
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Eq.  (4.14)  and  Eq.  (4.9)  could  form  a  Hamiltonian  dynamic  system  regarding  the 
dynamic control variable of investment 
j
i I , and the state variable, capital stocks 
j
i k . 
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Then from Eq. (4.9) and (4.14), 
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Eq. (4.15) and (4.16) have clear economic interpretations. Eq. (4.15) says that in the 
long-run steady state, investment in all the three activities should equal the depreciation 
rate of capital in these activities so that the capital stocks remain at a constant level. This 
equation implies some economic interpretation. The right hand side of Eq. (4.16) is the 
interest rate and discount factor or average rate of return in capital in the economy. The Cost effectiveness in River Management: Evaluation of Integrated River Policy System in Tidal Ouse      
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left hand side consists of two parts. The first part, similar as in the static analysis, is the 
marginal  effects  of  an  extra  unit  of  capital  committed  to  output,  abatement,  or 
abstraction on the firm’s individual costs, net of the marginal shadow value of capital 
committed  to  environmental  quality.  The  second  part  is  the  depreciation  rate  of  the 
capital stock. The right hand side is then the overall average rate of return of the capital 
invested  in  the  plant.  Therefore,  in  the  steady  state  equilibrium,  investment  should 
increase up to the point where it yields the same rate of return as in other area of the 
economy. Overall Eq.(4.16) states that under the optimal investment management, the 
internal rate of return of the capital stock should equal the rate of return of capital 
invested in elsewhere in economy.  
4.2 The Stability Property of Equilibrium 
The steady state may be found by setting the motion of costate, state and control 
variables of the dynamic system to zero, which in our case are the variables of
j
i µ , 
j
i k  
and 
j
i I . However, knowing the steady state equilibrium is not very meaningful without 
knowing  stability  of  the  dynamic  system.  An  equilibrium  point  that  only  exists  in 
principle, but cannot be reached, and which is such that the slightest disturbance leads to 
divergence – an unstable equilibrium point – is obliviously not very relevant from an 
economic  point  of  view  (Gandolfo  1997).  The  following  analysis  investigated  the 
stability properties of the dynamic system.  
4.2.1 Dynamic system of 
j
i k & , 
j
i I &  
I already have that 
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∗ ∗ δ &                       …(4.9). 
From Eq. (4.11),  ) (




i I C µ , so Eq. (4.14) becomes 
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∗ ∑λ δ &   …(4.17)  
Due  to  the  nonlinearity  of  the  dynamic  system  defined  by 
j
i k & , 
j
i I & ,  the  global 
stability of this system cannot be easily investigated. As this system is autonomous, the 
following  linearised  system  in  the  neighbourhood  of  its  steady  state  is  a  good Cost effectiveness in River Management: Evaluation of Integrated River Policy System in Tidal Ouse      
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approximation to the original non-linear system formed by Eq. (4.8) and (4.17) around 
the steady state equilibrium (Gandolfo 1997).  
When 
∗ x  is an equilibrium,  n j i
x
x f
A x t x A t x
j
i ,... 2 , 1 , ,
) (













∗ & .  A 
is the Jacobian matrix of the system evaluated at the equilibrium point. If the equilibrium 
point in the linear approximation is globally stable, then it is locally stable at the original 
non-linear system. The converse is not necessarily true (Xepapadeas 1997).  
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1 The value of element  22 a  in the Jacobian matrix determined as below; 
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i i I C denote the second and third order differentiation against the investments 
in each of the three sectors respectively. Since 0 =
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If  0 det 21 12 22 11 ≠ − = a a a a A , the qualitative behaviour of the trajectories of the 




i I k  is the same 
as that of the linearized homogeneous system (Xepapadeas 1997).  The sign of  A det  
then indicates the stability properties of the dynamic system.  
The signs of the partial derivatives of costs and water quality with respect to 
j
i k  and 
j
i I  determine the sign of  A det . Since it is more expensive to accelerate the increase in 
capital stock,  0 ) ( , 0 ) (




i i I C I C . From the relationship stated in Eq. (4.9), it is 
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.  Due  to  the  increasing  marginal  damage  of 
























. On the other hand, the effect 
of  abatement  on  pollution  effluent  is  either  constant  or  diminishing  in  most  of  the 













From  the  discussion  and  assumptions  above,  it  is  not  difficult  to  see  that 
j a a a a A ∀ < − = , 0 det 21 12 22 11 .  Therefore the  eigenvalues  of the Jacobian  matrix 




i I k  of  the  non-linear  dynamic 
system 
j
i I &  is a saddle point equilibrium for the capital stock and investment, and the 
trajectories in the plane display a property of a saddle point, at least locally.  
4.2.2 Qualitative analysis: phase diagram 
Since many dynamic systems of non-linear differential equations cannot be solved 
analytically, the qualitative properties of their solutions can sometimes be described and 
examined by a graphic device, phase diagram (Léonard and Long 1992).  
                                                       
2 This may not always be true in reality. An exceptional case in reality could be found in Hanley 
et al. (1998), in which the abatement of pollution in a particularly large firm has decreasing 
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The  intersection  of  the  lines  0 =
j
i k &  and  0 =
j
i I & is  the  saddle  point  steady  state 








i I k  which is illustrated by the 
phase  plane  of  the  system
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i k is the maximum value 
j
i k could take
4. The sign of 
j
i k & , 
j
i I &  in the regions 











.  Holding 
j
i k  
constant, an increase in 
j
i I  will result in an increase in 
j
i I & , 
j
i I &  is positive above  0 =
j
i I &  











,  so 
j
i k &  is  negative  to  the right  of 
isocline  0 =
j
i k &  and positive to the left.  The phase diagram is illustrated as Figure 1. 
Since we have shown that the Jacobian matrix  A has a negative determinant, the 




i I k . A unique 
property of saddle point equilibrium is that there is only one trajectory in the plan would 
converge to the steady state equilibrium while others only diverge away from it (Hoy et 
al. 2001). The two lines, s and r, determined by the eigenvectors of the Jacobian matrix 
A respectively, are the asymptotes to all the remaining trajectories (Gandolfo 1997), 
while  s is the  stable  arm  of  saddle  point The  analytical and numerical  methods  for 
identify the stable arm of saddle-point equilibrium are discussed by Shone (2002) with 
specified functions. 
4.3 Implication of river policy 
The  section  below  discussed  the  policy  implication  of  two  types  of  economic 
incentive instruments, the ETS scheme and TPP system. The environmental economists 
have advertised these instruments over the last few decades (Oates and Strassmann 1984; 
Baumol and Oates 1988; Perman et al. 1996; Hanley et al. 1997; Cowan 1998). But in 
most  of  the  research,  the  application  of  these  instruments  was  restrained  to  static 
analysis, only few of them discussed the possible implication under dynamic system 
(Xepapadeas 1997). This paper did not discuss their implication in a static situation, but 
the implementation in a dynamic regulating system to improve the water quality in a 
river system. I also pointed out the differences between those under the static analysis. 
4.3.1 ETS scheme 
Under the ETS scheme, a firm in principle is required to pay (receive) an aggregate 
emission and water abstraction tax (subsidy) at any site along the river, depends on 
whether they discharge or abstract more than the baseline right they are initially allowed 
                                                       
4 Recalling the increasing marginal damage to the water quality from effluent discharge and water 
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by  the  environment  authority.  The  tax  (subsidy)  for  source  at  site  i  is 
( ) ( ) as is
s
i i es is
s
i i ia ie t d t b e e T T ⋅ ⋅ − + ⋅ ⋅ − = + ∑ ∑
0 0 β β ,  where  es t  and  as t  are  the  tax 
rates for effluent discharge or water abstraction at site s  that the firm affects. Thus the 
objective of a cost-minimizing firm under the ETS is to  
] ) ( ) ( ) ), ( ), ( ), ( ( [
0 0
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The current value Hamiltonian for the problem is  
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i k I k δ & ,                                   …(4.9) 
along with the transversality condition (4.10). 
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Comparing  the  FOCs  under  the  ETS  and  relative  to  (4.6)  to  (4.10),  when  the 




















λ ,  the  equilibria  achieved  through  cost 
minimization  management  would  be  the  same  as  the  pollution  control  optimum  of 
minimized cost through direct control. 
When these tax rates are applied, not only the two different policy instruments would 
lead to the same equilibrium, it also insures that the dynamic of the systems under the 
two policy instruments have the same properties of stability. That is, the dynamic system 
under  ETS  has  saddle  point  equilibrium  with  only  one  trajectory  converging  to  the Cost effectiveness in River Management: Evaluation of Integrated River Policy System in Tidal Ouse      
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steady state equilibrium. Due to the difficulty of evaluating the appropriate value of 
shadow price s λ , tax rates might not always lead to the optimum, thus the ETS might not 
be cost efficient. However, recalling the Jacobian matrix  A, it can be proved that the 
stability properties of the dynamic system under a ETS will remain the same as long as 

















4.3.2 TPP system 
In a TPP system a firm receives an initial quantity of effluent discharge permits or 
water  abstraction  licenses  or  both,  either  through  auction  or  “grandfathering” 
distribution from the environment authority, denoted as 
0
is e  and 
0
is β  for the site s  from 
the firm at site i. The firm will demand more permits if its pollution emission and water 
abstraction effects  exceed  the  permits they  hold for  any  site,  if it is  more  costly  to 
increase abatement capacity or reduce production or vice versa. 
Although TPP and tax schemes are usually regarded as having equivalent effects, 
there are still some differences between them. One is that the optimal value of the tax 
rates requires has to be chosen by the environment authority while in the TPP system the 
price is achieved by market automatically. Another important difference is that pollution 
permits are rights to pollute. Once they are purchased, pollution is allowed. So purchase 
of  pollution  permits  is  more  like  a  lump-sum  payment  compared  with  the  annual 
payment as tax or subsidy. Although the recent pollution permits are less likely to be 
valid  forever,  permits  are  often  renewable  at  a  negligible  price  compared  with  the 
purchase  payment.  Since  initial  permits  could  be  allocated  either  through 
“grandfathering” or auction, the model only considers pollution control costs after initial 
distribution of permits.  
The  objective  of  cost  minimization  for  the  firm  at  site i  (assuming  its  effluent 
discharge and water abstraction are carried out locally) can be indicated as below: 
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s.t. (4.2),  0 ) ( , 0 ) ( ≥ ≥ t t e β  and  ) 0 (
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Since  
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The current value Hamiltonian is  
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i k I k δ & ,  j ∀                           …(4.9) 
along with the transversality condition (4.10). 
In order to examine the steady state and compare it with to the ETS, we differentiate 
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Substituting 
j
i µ  and 
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i I k µ & & & , (4.26) is equivalent to (4.19) when 
r t P es es / =  and  r t P as as / = , which is derived under the ETS. Therefore the ETS and 
TPP system lead to the same steady state equilibrium for investment and capital stock in 
each sector. This result implies that purchase of one pollution permit the firm saves the Cost effectiveness in River Management: Evaluation of Integrated River Policy System in Tidal Ouse      
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firm an infinite stream of tax payment for this unit of pollution. Therefore it needs to pay 
an amount equal to the present value of the aggregate tax payment. The convergence and 
stability properties of the steady state equilibrium in the TPP system are the same as that 
in the ETS.  
4.4 Comparative Statics 
4.4.1 Short-run
5 comparative statics 
 Assuming  the  effluent  discharge  is  a  function  of  the  output  and  abatement, 
) , ( i i i i q Z e α = , the short-run maximum principle of static analysis in the ETS can be 
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Due to the implicit function theorem (Gandolfo 1997; Xepapadeas 1997; Hoy et al. 
2001), the short-run comparative statics based on the (4.27) and (4.28) gives the effects 
































β                        …(4.29)  
where  ee C  represents the second order partial derivative of cost function with respect to 
effluent discharge. The abatement costs are assumed to have increasing marginal costs, 
i.e.  0 , , ≥ ββ β C C C e ee . 
When  0


























































































































                                                       
5 Short-run here refer to the period during which the plant is unable to vary its capacity of effluent 
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Therefore, it can be shown analytically that when the tax rate on one pollution type 
(either effluent discharge or water abstraction) increases, the corresponding activity will 
be restrained due to the more potent policy while other activities will become relatively 
“cheaper” to apply.  
4.4.2 Steady state comparative statics 
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Because  0 ) (
1 ' ' ≠
− ∗ j
i i I C  and (4.11), this can be reduced to 
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6 It can be proved that  1 , 0 , 0 , 0 = < − = ≤ ≤ I
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The comparative statics in the steady state indicate different effects compared with 
the short run effects. An increase in tax rates on one particular pollution activity reduces 
the activity, as it does in the short run. But in the steady state the capital stock and 
investment level in other activities are independent of the change. This is due to the 
independence of investment sectors. 
The results of comparative statics on the TPP system are very similar to those for a 
ETS (Xepapadeas 1997). Therefore the comparative statics under both instruments are 
summarized in Table 1 and 2.  
Table 1:   Short-run comparative statics 
  i e   i β  
es t   -  + 
as t   +  - 
es P   -  + 
as P   +  - 
Table 2:   Steady State Comparative Statics 
 
q
i k  
a
i k  
β
i k  
q
i I  
a
i I  
β
i I  
es t   -  +  0  -  +  0 
as t   0  0  -  0  0  - 
es P   -  +  0  -  +  0 
as P   0  0  -  0  0  - 
 
5. Empirical example of water quality management in tidal 
Ouse 
This empirical example described the methods and result of static optimisation when 
the  variation  of  assimilative  capacity  was  taken  into  account  by  including  various 
options to improve the water quality in tidal Ouse. In this optimisation, the variation of 
assimilative capacity was assorted with the effects of changing the location of effluent 
discharge. For the first time, the option of reducing water abstraction to improvement 
assimilative capacity and water quality was also integrated with the standard option of 
reducing effluent discharge.  Therefore, reducing effluent discharge, changing discharge 
location and reducing water abstraction were integrated evaluated against their effects on 
improving water quality and corresponding cost incurred, to achieve the least cost of 
obtaining the required water quality in the tidal Ouse.  Cost effectiveness in River Management: Evaluation of Integrated River Policy System in Tidal Ouse      
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QUESTS1D model, which is a hydrological model used by the EA to set the effluent 
consents in the tidal Ouse was utilized in this research to predict the resulted water 
quality  at  different  WQM  sites  under  various  conditions.  The  simulation  results  of 
QUESTS1D model were used to generate a system of water quality functions that can 
predict  the  water  qualities just  based  on a few  most  influencing  factors.  QUEST1D 
divided the tidal Ouse into 282 cells, around 1 km each. The system of water quality 
functions consisted of five functions for five different cells in the QUESTS1D model 
around three WQM sites, which are likely experience severe DO sag issue during low 
flow summer. In this research, they were the water qualities of cell 180 at Selby, cell 192 
and 193 at Long Drax, and cell 197 and 199 at Boothferry Bridge, in terms of 5%ile 
DO%. The most influencing factors to the water qualities of these cells include the 
effluent discharge levels from both industries and Sewage Treatment Plants (STWs), 
water abstraction from river Ouse and Derwent, and the effluent discharge location. The 
associated  cots  of  these  options  were  estimated  based  on  the  data  provided  by  the 
industries and EA. The summation of annual costs was to be minimised against given 
water quality target in the tidal Ouse.  
The  static  optimisation  was  calculated  through  the  General  Algebraic  Modelling 
System (GAMS) to provide the optimal solution for the cost minimisation. It was proved 
that relocating the effluent discharges was most effective measure to improve the water 
quality. With effluents from Selby area being discharged at downstream of the river 
Ouse, the water quality along the river Ouse could be significantly improved even in the 
low flow conditions as 1996, but at less cost than it incur currently.  
5.1 Constraints: the System of Water Quality Functions 
The simplified system of water quality function for the following points in 1996 is 
shown as below Table 3. The first column is the number of cells predicted through the 
simplified system. The numbers of the cells to be predicted through the system of water 
quality functions are chosen at 180, 192, 193, 197 and 199. Cell 180 is around WQM 
site at  Selby,  while cell 192  and  193 locate  at  Long  Drax  and  cell 197 and 199  at 
Boothferry Bridge. The WQM sites of Naburn Weir and Cawood are not regarded to be 
at risk as their DO% are more than 60% even in the worst situation in 1996, therefore 
the water quality functions did not take into account these two sites. The same reason 
applies to Blacktoft, where the water quality is basically dominated by the flow of Trent 
and is consistent over various management options in river Ouse. The water qualities at 
the five points are predicted simultaneously through this system of functions as 5%ile 
DO% of the cell. Cost effectiveness in River Management: Evaluation of Integrated River Policy System in Tidal Ouse      
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Table 3:   Coefficients table of the system of water quality functions 
Cell  constant  X  X
2  ln(SBOD)  ln(Ouse)  ln(Derw)  ln(Sna)  ln(Sand)  ln(Tho) 
180  -442.09  1.474  -0.042  -3.604  128.210  9.220  None  None  None 
192  -113.406  -0.028  -0.020  -9.238  37.174  23.418  None  None  None 
193  -79.943  -0.424  -0.011  -9.432  28.993  23.206  None  None  None 
197  37.749  -1.552  0.019  -9.032  1.060  17.697  0.141  -0.228  0.085 
199  42.566  -1.518  0.020  -8.922  -0.763  16.800  0.160  -0.261  0.098 
 
The sequent nine variables are the estimators of water quality function: the first one 
is  constant;  the  X  in  the  second  and  third  column  is  the  distance  from  discharge 
location to the Trent Fall in kilometre. SBOD is the total tonnes of BOD5 discharged 
from the sources around Selby per day, from three industries in Selby and the Barlby and 
Selby STWs. Ouse and Derwent are river flows (m3/s) of rivers Ouse and Derwent 
while the flows of other tributaries remains unchanged. Sna, Sand and Tho are another 
three different STWs in the tributaries Aire and Don, having no effects on the first three 
points. The location of effluent discharges is best fit to the water quality as a quadratic 
function, as the improvement is quite slow when  X  is large (very upstream) or small 
(very  downstream),  but  faster  in  the  mid-range  of  tidal  Ouse.  The  effect  of  BOD5 
discharge on water quality is best described as logarithmic function, so is the effect of 
river flow. This is understandable as both of the factors have diminishing marginal effect 
on the water quality. See Appendix 1 for the details of the regression analysis. 
5.2 Objectives: Cost Functions of Pollution Abatement   
The objective cost function is the aggregated costs of various options, including the 
cost of effluent abatement within individual industry and STW, the cost of reducing 
water abstraction from rivers Ouse and Derwent and the cost of moving the effluent 
discharges along the river Ouse. The optimal solution is the combination of the three 
options when their aggregated cost is least and the water quality target is satisfied. All 
the cost functions were estimated by the cost data provide by the industries and STWs 
themselves over several years. They were derived from the regression results of statistic 
package of SPSS and generated highly agreement against the observations. The exact 
functions were not provided here for confidential reasons. 
5.3 Static Optimisation Analysis  
Having  estimated  the  cost  functions  of  effluent  treatment,  abstraction  reduction, 
discharge  relocation,  and  the  system  of  water  quality  functions,  an  arbitrary  water 
quality target at the water WQM sites to be achieved through the river management 
options is expected to be obtained at the least costs through the static optimisation. The Cost effectiveness in River Management: Evaluation of Integrated River Policy System in Tidal Ouse      
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static  optimisation  takes  the  form  as  below,  where  s Q and s Q are  the  water  quality 
prediction and target at cell s in terms of DO%:  
Minimize   mov abs STW ind total Cost Cost Cost Cost C + + + =  
. .t s   s s s Q Tho Sand Sna Derw Ouse SBOD X f Q ≥ = ) , , , , , , (             
The cells s  predicted in this research are cells 180, 192, 193, 197 and 199, reflecting 
the water qualities at Selby, Long Drax and Boothferry Bridge that are at risk of DO sag 
during the summer. The arbitrary water quality target for these cells can be various, but 
is assumed as 30% DO% at 5%ile in order to protect the return of salmon. All the three 
options have effects on water quality improvements at different prices. Analysing the 
effects on water quality and economic cost of the trade-off among these options, the 
static optimisation is able to find the best combination levels of them, to satisfy the 
quality target at least cost. When no constraints applied, the optimal solution would be at 
the point where each option has the same marginal cost over water quality improvement. 
This research used General Algebraic Modelling System (GAMS) to find the optimal 
solution.  GAMS  has  been  widely  applied  for  issues  involving  computable  general 
equilibrium models, particularly become popular in the area of environmental economics 
to model the cost of environmental policy (Dellink 2005). In this research, GMAS was 
used to optimise the cost minimization problem facing a  given water quality target, 
through a range of non-linear programming solvers (Brooke et al. 1998; McCarl 2004). 
5.4 Static Optimisation Results  
Due to the European Directive of Urban Waste Water Treatment (UWWTD), it is 
unlikely  in  reality  to  change  the  abatement  levels  in  the  STWs.  By  far,  two  of  the 
industries have been using their effluent treatment plants for a quite long period and 
would have to install new plant if the effluent discharge consents become more stringent. 
Therefore an optimal solution with slacker abatement requirement would be welcomed 
by  the  industries  facing  international  competitions,  as  well  as the local  economy  of 
Selby.  In  this  research,  all  the  five  STWs  (Barlby,  Selby,  Sna,  San  and  Tho)  were 
assumed  to  be  working  at  the  current  levels  in  2004  to  comply  with  the  UWWTD 
requirement,  while  the  abatement  levels  in  industries,  water  abstraction  levels  and 
effluent discharge location were all subject to optimisation.   
The optimal solution calculated using GAMS was given as below. The abatement in 
the  STWs  was  fixed  at  current  levels  of  2004.  The  resulted  water  total  abstraction 
remains  unchanged  although  more  water  abstraction  was  advised  to  be  from  river Cost effectiveness in River Management: Evaluation of Integrated River Policy System in Tidal Ouse      
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Derwent. The optimal abatement levels of the three industries in Selby, water abstraction 
levels and effluent discharge location were given in Table 4. 
















1.081  1.081  1.081  0.599  1.955  0.637  3.530  14.890  0.498  7.902  2.954 
Table 5:   Resulted water qualities at WQM sites 
Site  Selby  Long Drax  Boothferry Bridge 
Cell  Q180  Q192  Q193  Cell  Q180 
DO%  30.000  34.231  33.968  DO%  30.000 
Table 6:   Cost of river management 
  Abatement  Abstraction  Relocation  Total 
Cost (m£)  4.074  5.541  0.746  10.361 
 
In this optimal solution for the least cost of river management, there was no need for 
the industries in Selby to abate their effluents since the STWs had reduced the pollution 
more than enough. Reducing water abstraction levels was still too costly as a means of 
improving water quality than the others. However, since the cost of water abstraction 
were same, the shifting of water abstraction from Ouse to Derwent suggested that the 
marginal effect of water abstraction on the water quality was higher in river Ouse than in 
river Derwent. Therefore it was better to just abstract from river Derwent if possible. 
The optimal discharge location was 14.890 km upstream from the Trent Fall, downstream 
of  the  confluence  of  river  Don.  The  dilution  effects  from  tributaries  Aire  and  Don 
seemed quite promising according to the choice. 
Table 5 showed the resulted water qualities at the five points concerned. The two 
binding points were, Q180 and Q199. The water qualities of the other three points were 
significantly higher than the requirement. Water quality along the river Ouse was largely 
improved between Selby and Boothferry compared the current situation, and the DO sag 
disappeared  in  the  river  Ouse  even  in  the  year  as  bad  as  1996.  The  QUESTS1D 
simulation using the optimal solution confirmed the prediction from the water quality 
functions. Figure 2 indicated the 5%ile DO% along the river Ouse under the optimal 
solution generated using GAMS.  
From the simulation results of QUESTS1D, it can be seen that the predictions from 
the water quality functions system were generally more pessimistic than the simulation 
results. This means the optimal solution obtained from GAMS optimisation would result Cost effectiveness in River Management: Evaluation of Integrated River Policy System in Tidal Ouse      
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in slightly better water quality in reality, which reduces the risk of failure in compliance 
due to inevitable model errors and uncertainties. The DO% of river Ouse following the 
optimal solution, as indicated in the simulation, decreased first due to the tidal inflow 
and the resuspended sediments, then slowly increased after Selby and reach the best 
around Drax, then decrease again, but finally became stable around 35% and recovered 
after the confluence with river Trent.   
Figure 2:  DO% under optimal solution  
 
The optimal solution estimated an aggregate cost of at least £10.361m for the river 
management  to  comply  with  the  30%  DO%  requirement.  However,  since  the  water 
abstraction was not reduced, the abstraction cost is just to satisfy the water demand 
rather  than  improving  the  water  quality.  This  should  not  be  regarded  as  the  costs 
incurred by water quality improvement. The rest costs of the effluent abatement and 
relocating the discharge site account for £4.820m in together, achieving much better 
water quality along the river Ouse at slightly less cost than that is currently endured by 
the  industries  and  STWs.  More  than  60%  of  the  costs  of  effluent  abatement  and 
relocation  were  contributed  from  the  STWs  since  their  abatement  levels  remained 
unchanged. The relocation of effluent discharge only accounted for 15% of the costs but 
had obviously much significant impact on the river water quality.     
As a virtue of the simplified system of water quality functions, the optimisation 
could  be  easily  revised  against  different  water  quality  targets.  This  makes  it  very 
convenient to investigate the difference among solutions to various policy scenarios. 
Therefore  this  optimisation  system  could  work  for  not  only  the  30%  DO%  at  the 
selected cells, but also applicable to other water quality targets that are required by the 
environmental authority. 
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There are also some potential constraints to the optimal solution. The first one lies 
into the construction needed to transfer the effluents to new discharge location. Although 
the annual cost of transfer is just a small proportion of the aggregate annual cost, the 
capital  investment  required  to  build  the  storage  facility  and  lay  down  the  pipes  are 
almost £10m. This enormous cost could be a possible obstacle to the acceptance of the 
solution, especially considering that the STWs would not benefit from the solution since 
they have to maintain the levels of abatement. If the industries were asked to bear capital 
cost alone, the investment cost would be too high to be accepted by the slim-profited 
manufacture industries. The  second  is  due to  same fact  mentioned  above.  Since the 
STWs have to maintain their abatement levels because of UWWTD, they would be 
reluctant to pay for the effluent relocation that make no change to their responsibility of 
abatement.  Reallocation  of  the  benefits  among  the  industries  and  STWs  through 
negotiation could probably reach a solution for the two constraints in order to ensure the 
STWs’ participation, since the resulted slackness in the industries on effluent discharges 
were partly attributed by the abatements in the STWs. Appropriate payment to the STWs 
would motivate their participations while still leave the industries better off, given the 
payment  is  not  greater  than  the  industries’  benefit  obtained  from  the  relocation  of 
effluent discharge. This could be achieved through either emission ETS or TPP system. 
But this is beyond the discussion of this paper. Finally, it is needed to point out that 
although the STWs could not reduce their abatement levels through the optimal solution, 
they  still  benefit  from  the  increased  potential  of  scaling  up  as  the  DO  sag  issue  is 
removed from Selby area by the optimal solution. This is consistent to the increasing 
demand of sewage services initiated by the increase of population and economy in the 
North Yorkshire and Lincolnshire (Jarvie et al. 1997) and can reduce the risks of failure 
in providing sewage service during the extreme conditions such as flood.  
6. Conclusion 
The river water quality control in the estuarine system such as Ouse/Humber system 
is  not  at  all  a  simple  issue.  The  resuspended  sediment  due  to  the  tidal  movement 
deteriorates  the  impacts  on  the  river  water  quality  of  effluent  discharges  from  both 
industry and STWs. This is also accompanied by the impacts of water reduction when 
significant  water  volume  is  taken  for  supplying  water  within  the  whole  catchment. 
Because of the various drivers for the water quality issue in the tidal Ouse, it is not 
reasonable to regulate on just one of them to improve the water quality. This paper tried 
to explore an integrated river policy to improve the water quality in the tidal Ouse and 
remove  the  DO  sag  during  the  summer  in  order  to  resume  the  salmon  return.  The 
integrated river policy included the options of improving water quality through reducing Cost effectiveness in River Management: Evaluation of Integrated River Policy System in Tidal Ouse      
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effluent  discharges  from  industries  and  STWs,  reducing  the  water  abstraction  from 
various sites and relocating the position of effluent discharges. Optimal solution was 
provided by solving the constrained optimisation problem of minimizing the cost of 
river quality management for particular water quality target.  
This paper discussed the necessary conditions for the cost minimisation problem 
with specific water quality requirement, both under static and dynamic system. In the 
optimisation issue, the spatial location of effluent discharge and water abstraction were 
taken into account based on their effects on the water qualities at the EA’s WQM site. 
Reduction  in  both  effluent  discharge  and  water  abstraction  were  also  included,  and 
evaluated based on their costs and impacts on water quality improvement. This paper 
also  discussed  the  mechanism  of  allocating  the  pollution  abatement  and  water 
abstraction among the sources through the policy instruments of ETS scheme and TPP 
system. The choice of policy instruments in pollution control has been discussed for 
some  time.  Most  economists  agreed  that,  although  there  are  still  limitations  in 
implementation, MBIs have several key advantages over the direct controls, particularly 
in  the  cost  savings  and  the  continuous  motivation  to  pollution  control.  This  paper 
showed how the ETS scheme and TPP system could be implemented for water quality 
management, when the location of emissions and abstraction were taken into account. 
Some conclusions of the research are as followed: 
1.  Because of the different location effects of pollution, the equilibrium of least cost 
solution  will  take  into  account  both  effluents  and  water  abstractions,  following  the 
variation of assimilative capacity of the river water.     
2.  In the static analysis, the least cost equilibrium requires that the ratio between the 
marginal costs of water abstraction and its effects on the water quality be equal to the 
marginal costs of effluent discharge and its effects on the water quality, which is the 
shadow cost of river water quality at the equilibrium.  
3.  When  the  dynamic  optimisation  is  considered,  in  addition  to  the  conditions 
required in the static analysis, the least cost solution requires that the internal rate of 
return on investment should equal the rate of return on investment elsewhere in the 
economy.  
4.  The steady state equilibrium is a saddle point, therefore the combination of capital 
stocks and investment decisions has to follow a particular trajectory through which the 
least cost solutions at each period of time will eventually lead to stable equilibrium of 
the dynamic system. Since initial capital stocks are determined by exogenous investment Cost effectiveness in River Management: Evaluation of Integrated River Policy System in Tidal Ouse      
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choice, there is necessity for the plant to find this temporal investment path in order to 
achieve the stable equilibrium of the dynamic system. 
5.  The  empirical  example  of  the  water  quality  improvement  in  the  tidal  Ouse 
consists of a system of water quality function derived from QUESTS1D model, and the 
cost  functions  of  water  quality  improvement.  Solving  the  constrained  optimisation 
problem  using  GAMS  revealed  that  the,  through  specific  combination  of  effluent 
discharge and water abstraction, and location of discharge, the water quality of tidal 
Ouse could be significantly improved even under the worst flow condition over the last 
ten years, with less costs than that borne by the industries and STWs. The required water 
quality target of 30% DO% at 5%ile what was proved infeasible through the reduction of 
effluent  discharges  alone  under  the  flow  condition  of  1996,  can  only  be  achieved 
through  the  combining  options  taking  into  account  effluent  relocation  and  water 
abstraction reduction.  
  A relatively novel feature of this research is the integrated management of effluent 
discharge and water abstraction within the same river policy. The variation of effluent 
discharge location was considered to reflect the spatial difference between the pollution 
sources. The integration of this regarding to river policy determination could include the 
integration of both effluent discharge and water abstraction, integration of timing and 
spatial effects, and the integration of both physical effect on water quality and economic 
costs to the society. This research has evaluated these integrations although the variation 
of  timing  of  effluent  discharges  was  not  discussed  in  this  paper  due  to  its 
impracticability. This integration enables the policy maker to offer sufficient flexibility 
in the pollution control options available in order to achieve cost effectiveness in the 
water  quality  management  for  the  estuarine  system,  which  is  consistent  to  the 
requirement of WFD. But there are more options and policy instruments that are not 
considered in this research, and many of them may well be effective even they were not 
recommended  in  this  research  for  tidal  Ouse.  The  determination  of  integrated  river 
policy  aiming  at  achieving  the  water  quality  target  at the least cost  depends  on  the 
particular river system and catchment concerned, in order to avoid the disproportionate  
cost coming from ineffective regulations. 
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